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Dirks v. SEC: Delineating the Scope
of Insider Trading Liability Under
Rule 10b-5
INTRODUCTION

"Insider trading" refers to trading in the securities markets while
in possession of material information' that is not available to the
general public. 2 Such trading has long been recognized as a threat
to the fairness and honesty underlying our nation's securities markets
in that the use of nonpublic information3 by corporate insiders and
others in securities transactions creates the potential for substantial
profits with little attendant economic risk to the insider.'
In response to trading abuses in the securities markets Congress
enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.' In 1942, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated Rule lOb-5 6 under sec1. "Material information" refers to information which would be important
to an investor in making a decision to buy or sell a security. COMMITTEE ON ENERGY
AND COMMERCE, INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS ACT OF 1983, H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1983) [hereinafter cited as COMMITTEE].
2. Id.
3. "Nonpublic information" refers to information not generally available to
ordinary investors in the marketplace. In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C.
633, 643 (1971).
4. COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 21. The term "corporate insiders" or "traditional insiders" is commonly used to refer to corporate officers, directors and majority
shareholders. Their "[e]conomic risk is small because [subsequent] public disclosure
of inside information spurs significant price movements in securities .

.

. ."

Id.

5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982)) [hereinafter referred to as the 1934 Act].
The 1934 Report of the Senate Banking Committee stated: "Among the most
vicious practices unearthed at the subcommittee was the flagrant betrayal of their
fiduciary duties by directors and officers of corporations who used their positions
of trust and the confidential information which came to them in such positions,

to aid them in their market activities." REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND
CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICE, S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55

(1934). See also COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 3.
6. Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange:
(a) To employ any devise, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of material fact or omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
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tion 10(b)7 of the 1934 Act to accomplish, inter alia, the congressional goals of "fair and honest markets." 8 Rule 10b-5 is a broad
antifraud provision which expressly prohibits affirmative misrepresen-

tations and half-truths in connection with the purchase or sale of any

security. There is, however, no specific prohibition in Rule lOb-5
against one who trades while in possession of nonpublic information.

Largely through administrative and judicial interpretation, Rule 10b-5

has been applied to impose liability on insiders who trade securities
on the basis of nonpublic information.9 Moreover, Rule 10b-5 has
been interpreted to apply to tippees-those who receive material nonpublic information from insiders-who trade on the basis of such
information.' 0 What has not been made clear, however, are the standards to be applied in tippee trading situations. In recent years, the
number of administrative actions brought by the SEC alleging violation of the insider trading provisions has increased substantially." Decisions in many of these cases continue to define the perimeters of insider
trading under the federal securities laws.
On July 1, 1983 the Supreme Court of the United States
articulated a significant development in the area of insider trading
liability under the federal securities laws in Dirks v. SEC.' The Court

held that a market analyst, who traded and caused others to trade
in the securities of Equity Funding Corporation of America on the
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983).
7. Section 10(b) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange:
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest for the protection of
investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982); see also S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
55-68 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 11 (1934).
9. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 976 (1969).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 38-48.
11. See COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 21.
12. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
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basis of nonpublic information received from a corporate insider, had
assumed no duty to the shareholders of Equity Funding to disclose
or abstain from using the nonpublic information concerning the
existence of fraudulent practices at Equity Funding. 3 The Court
reasoned that the insider who revealed the information had not
breached his fiduciary duty to the Equity Funding shareholders because
his purpose in giving the tip was not personal gain. The Court
duty to the
concluded that absent a breach of the insider's fiduciary
4
shareholders, no duty to speak arose in his tippee.1
This note will examine the two major issues which the SEC and
the courts have addressed in their attempts to regulate insiders who
trade on the basis of nonpublic information: 1) under what circumstances will a duty to disclose nonpublic information be imposed
on an insider or a tippee; and 2) to whom does an insider or a tippee
owe a duty to disclose nonpublic information? These issues will be
analyzed in light of the Dirks decision, followed by a discussion of
the SEC's response to the problem of insider trading.
BACKGROUND

At common law, a plaintiff was required to prove the elements
of a deceit action to impose liability on a corporate insider who made
a misrepresentation in a securities transaction. The prima facie case
required a showing that the plaintiff justifiably relied to his detriment on a misrepresentation of a material fact, made by the defendant who had knowledge of its falsity and who intended that the
plaintiff rely on it.6 Moreover, liability would be imposed upon an
insider who merely kept silent and traded stock on the basis of nonpublic information only when the insider had an affirmative duty of
disclosure.' 7 Authorities were divided as to the circumstances which
would give rise to the insider's duty to disclose nonpublic information.'"
Nonetheless, the courts did agree that a duty to disclose would not
13.

14.

Id. at 3258.
Id.

15. See 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE lob-5 § 2.01(a), at 1-6 (1980).
16. Id. These elements were especially difficult to prove when the securities
transaction Was not face-to-face or took place on an impersonal securities exchange.
Id.at 1-6, 1-7. As a result, nondisclosure cases were rarely actionable at common
law. Id.at 1-7, 1-8; see also 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD
& COMMODITIES FRAUD § 2.7(1), at 55 (1967).
17. See, e.g., Wood v. Amory, 105 N.Y. 278, 281-82, 11 N.E.636, 637 (1887).
18. There were three general common-law views as to the circumstances which
would give rise to the insider's duty to disclose nonpublic information when trading
in the stock of his corporation. The "majority rule" held that corporate insiders
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be imposed upon an insider unless a fiduciary relationship or one
involving trust and confidence existed between the parties to the
transaction.' 9 Even when a common-law duty to disclose nonpublic
information did arise, however, its application was limited. No duty
to speak when trading was imposed on the corporate insider when
the purchasers of the securities were not shareholders prior to the
transaction, or when the transaction took place on a securities
exchange.2" With only these narrow exceptiois imposing an obligation on a corporate insider to speak in a securities transaction, "caveat
emptor" was the prevailing common-law rule. 2 '
To deal with the problem of fraud and deception in securities
transactions, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 193322 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.23 Through the administration of these
enactments, the SEC regulates the United States' securities markets. 2 '
owed a fiduciary duty to disclose nonpublic information to the corporation only,
and not to individual shareholders. R. FROME & V. ROSENZWEIG, SALES OF SECURITIES
BY CORPORATE INSIDERS § 8.102, at 234 (1975); see also 5B A. JACOBS, supra note
15 § 2.01(b), at 1-9, 1-10. The "special facts" doctrine stated that an insider could
have a duty to disclose "general knowledge which he may possess" to individual
shareholders where "special facts" were present. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419,
423 (1909). The "Kansas rule" held that an insider acts in a relation of scrupulous
trust and confidence when negotiating with a shareholder for the purchase of his
shares and therefore has an affirmative duty to the shareholder to disclose all information material to the transaction which can be disclosed without adverse impact to
the company. Hotchkiss v. Fisher, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932).
19. See, e.g., Wood v. Amory, 105 N.Y. 278, 281-82, I N.E.636, 637 (1887);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 551(2)(a) (1976). In this note, the
common-law fiduciary duty that an insider owed to the corporation's shareholders
not to trade on nonpublic information is also referred to as the fiduciary principle.
20. No duty to disclose when trading was imposed on the insider where the
purchaser was not already a shareholder because no fiduciary relationship existed
at the time of the transaction. Case Comments, A New Concept of Fraud on the
Securities Exchange-A Comment on In re Cady Roberts & Co., 15 S.C.L. REV.
557, 563-64 (1963). Where trading occurred over a securities exchange, the transaction is impersonal and each party necessarily decides his own course of action free
from the influences of others. The plaintiff therefore could not establish the element
of.reliance in his common-law deceit action. See id.; see also Goodwin v. Agassiz,
283 Mass. 358, 363, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (1933).
21. See Coulom, Rule JOb-5 and the Duty to Disclose Market Information:
It Takes a Thief, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 93, 99 (1980).
22. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982)) [hereinafter referred to as the 1933 Act].
23. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982)).
24. The SEC administers both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act. It has broad
powers to "impose registration and prospectus requirements for new securities; registration and report requirements for corporations, brokers and dealers; and regulation
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In 1942, the SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5 25 as a broad antifraud pro-

vision under section 10(b)26 of the 1934 Act.
One of the purposes of the 1934 Act was to preclude corporate

insiders from profiting at the expense of public shareholders by using

inside information as a basis for buying and selling securities,27 and
Rule lOb-5 was in fact specifically adopted in hasty response to a
misuse of nonpublic information by a corporate insider.28 Thereafter,
full disclosure emerged as a dominant theme of the federal securities
laws. 29 Recently, the SEC and the courts have begun to explore the
full scope of Rule lOb-5 as it applies to the nondisclosure of inside
information.
of exchanges and over-the-counter markets." See Comment, The Prospectusfor Rule
X-lOb-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120 (1950).
25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). See supra note 6.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Section 10(b) has been described as a catchall
provision enabling the Commission to prescribe rules and regulations to deal with
new manipulative devices in securities transactions. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976).
27. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-11 (1934); H.R. REP.
No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934).
28. Milton Freeman, who has claimed authorship of Rule lOb-5, has asserted
that the rule was drafted in response to a specific incident wherein a corporate president was purchasing stock in his own company from shareholders at a depressed
price after misrepresenting the future earning prospects of the firm. Freeman,
Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. LAW. 891, 922 (1967).
The administrative history of Rule lob-5 suggests that it was adopted to "close
a loophole" left open by § 17 (15 U.S.C. § 77g(a) (1982)) of the 1933 Act. SEC
Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). Section 17, the general antifraud provision of
the 1933 Act, is limited by its terms to prohibit fraud or deception "in the offer
or sale of any security." Section 10(b), the enabling legislation under which Rule
lob-5 was promulgated, is designed to reach fraud or deception "in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
Moreover, the coverage of Rufe lOb-5 is broader than that of other provisions
of the 1934 Act. Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 prohibit fraudulent or deceptive practices by "any person," with "persons" being given a broad definition in § 4(a)(9)
of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1982) ("Person" defined as "a natural person, company, government, or political subdivision, agency or instrumentality of a
government."). Previous sections of the 1934 Act imposed restrictions solely on directors, officers, and in some instances, controlling shareholders. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p (1982).
29. "The main theme of federal securities regulation is full disclosure. Both
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act attempt to insure the widest possible
dissemination of information about corporate affairs." Comment, supra note 24,
at 1120.
There are basically three different views of the policy which Rule lob-5 is intended to serve. The first view is that the rule was formulated to promote fairness
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THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE OR ABSTAIN

Since Rule 10b-5 contains no express prohibition against trading
on the basis of nonpublic information, the SEC and the courts have
sought to delineate a basis for imposing lOb-5 liability in nondisclosure
cases.3" It has been well established that there is no liability for nondisclosure trading absent a duty to speak.' That duty, to disclose
or abstain from trading on the basis of nonpublic information, arises
where a special relationship exists between the parties to the securities
transactions." Defining the nature of that "special relationship" is
thus central to delineating the boundaries of nondisclosure trading
liability.
Where the corporate insider deals-in-his firm's securities, the
nature of his office can give rise to nondisclosure liability. Traditional
insiders, the directors and management, are engaged in a fiduciary
relationship with their firm.3 3 At common law, this fiduciary relationship served to give rise, in some instances, to a duty to disclose
when trading.3 The enactment of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and
the promulgation of Rule lOb-5 provided a statutory alternative to

and equity by preventing one from taking " 'advantage of [inside] information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.' " Scott, Insider Trading:
Rule lOb-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 804 (1980)
(quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961)). The second view
is that it promotes the flow of information to the market so that the market may
function more efficiently. The third view is that the rule protects the property rights.
of thefirm in inside information. For a more complete discussion of these theories
and their implications, see Scott, supra, at 804.
30. It is reasonably certain that nondisclosure trading does not violate clause
(b) of Rule lOb-5 since its terms imply that some affirmative representation has /lready
been made. Clause (b) makes it unlawful "[t]o make any untrue statement of material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made
. . . not misleading . . . ." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). However, nondisclosure
trading may violate clauses (a) or (c) of Rule lOb-5. Clause (a) makes it unlawful
"[tlo employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud . . . ." Id. Clause (c) makes
it unlawful "[t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as fraud or deceit upon any person ....
Id. See 1 A. BROMBERG
& L. LOWENFELS, supra note 16, § 2.6(2), at 51.
31. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1980) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976); ALl, Federal Securities Code § 262(b)
(Proposed Official Draft 1978).
32. See 445 U.S. at 232-33.
33. See 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS,
§ 838 (rev. 1975).
34. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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the difficult to establish common-law deceit action.35 However, even
in a lOb-5 action, the basis for imposing the duty to disclose on the
insider remained the fiduciary principle. 36
Recently, the SEC has sought to extend the coverage to Rule
lOb-5 beyond directors, management, and controlling shareholders.
The Commission's concern has centered on the situation where the
insider passes nonpublic information to an outsider who then trades
on the basis of such information. This scenario has the potential to
permit the insider/tipper to achieve indirectly that which he was prohibited from doing directly.3 '
In re Cady, Roberts & Co.," marked the SEC's most notable
attempt to extend the duty to disclose beyond traditional insiders.
In Cady, Roberts, the board of directors of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation voted a lower quarterly dividend than they had declared in
previous quarters. A selling broker and partner of Cady, Roberts &
Co., a broker-dealer firm, received this information from a director
of Curtiss-Wright." Prior to the public release of the information,
the broker entered two sell orders on Curtiss-Wright stock for his
own accounts. When the news subsequently appeared on the Dow
Jones ticker tape, the Exchange suspended trading due to the large
number of sell orders. 0
The central issue addressed by the Commission was whether the
selling broker could be held responsible under Rule lOb-5 for trading
on the undisclosed, nonpublic information. The Commission recognized
that traditional insiders-officers, directors and controlling
shareholders-customarily had duties imposed on them to disclose or
abstain from trading on nonpublic information."' In deciding whether
Rule 10b-5 reached the activity of the broker, a tippee of the CurtissWright director, the Commission noted that the antifraud provisions
1947).

35.

See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802-03 (E.D. Pa.

36. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the FiduciaryPrinciple: A Post Chiarella
Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 17 (1982).
37. The 1934 Act expresses a policy prohibiting such circumvention of the
securities laws. Section 20(b) of the Securities Exchange Act states: "It shall be
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to do any act or thing which it would

be unlawful for such person to do under the [Act] or any rule or regulation thereunder

through or by means of any other person." 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b) (1982).
38. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
39. The director of Curtiss-Wright who passed the information to the selling
broker of Cady, Roberts was also a registered representative of Cady, Roberts. Id.
at 909.
40. Id.at 908-10.
41. Id.at 911.
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of the 1934 Act applied to "any person." ' 42 It concluded that a tippee could be subject to a duty to disclose or abstain from trading
on nonpublic information.43 The Commission's finding of this special
obligation rested on the presence of two principal elements:
[F]irst, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and
second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with
44
whom he is dealing.
Cady, Roberts was a case "of signal importance ' 45 because the
SEC's "relationship giving access" standard marked a significant
departure from the common-law principles of securities fraud.4 6 The
"access" standard broadened the scope of the special relationship
necessary for imposing the duty to speak.4 7 Based on this new standard the Commission suggested that there are other relationships which
might carry the special obligation to disclose or abstain from trading. 8
The "access" standard thus extended the duty to speak beyond
fiduciaries, imposing it on tippees of traditional insiders.
With respect to the issue of to whom the duty is owed, the second
element of the Cady, Roberts analysis demonstrated a significant
departure from common-law thinking. At common law, the fiduciary
duty of the insider was owed to the corporate entity."9 In the Cady,
Roberts analysis, however, the duty imposed on the insider ran "to
those with whom he [was] dealing," 5 " i.e., the individual investor.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.at 912.
45. Id.at 907.
46. See Coulom, supra note 21, at 105.
47. At common law, a duty to disclose was imposed on a corporate insider
only when he owed a fiduciary duty to the other party to the transaction involving
trust and confidence. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. Early applications of Rule lob-5 extended a duty to disclose only to traditional insiders: corporate directors, officers and majority shareholders. See supra notes 19 & 36 and
accompanying text. In Cady, Roberts, the Commission's "access" standard still required
a special relationship but any person who had information intended to be kept confidential for a corporate purpose could occupy that relationship. Cady, Roberts, 40
S.E.C. at 912.
48. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
49. According to the common law majority rule, the insider's duty to disclose
was owed solely to the corporation. See supra note 18.
50. 40 S.E.C at 912.
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The underpinning for this departure from the common law was based
on the notion that there was "inherent unfairness" in allowing one
in possession of an insider's informational advantage to compete with

"the buying public-wholly unprotected from the misuse of special
information."" This concern for disadvantage resulting from informational disparity suggested that the Commission viewed Rule lOb-5 as
imposing a parity-of-information requirement on transactions involving
insiders and their tippees.
The courts came to agree with the SEC's position that Rule lOb-5
must reach beyond traditional insiders to deter insider trading
effectively.52 In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,53 officers, directors and

some lower level employees of Texas Gulf Sulphur purchased stock
in their company prior to the public release of information concerning a discovery of extensive mineral deposits on company-owned land.5

The SEC sought to recover the profits made from the trading. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit articulated

a "'possession" test to determine whether these defendants had a duty
to disclose the nonpublic information before trading on it. The court

stated:

Anyone in possession of material inside information must either
disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a-corporate confidence, or he chooses not
to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities
concerned while such information remains undisclosed.55

The Second Circuit found that all the defendants had violated
Rule lOb-5 under this standard. 6 The court reasoned that the informa51.

Id.

52. See, e.g., Feldman v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 679 F.2d 1299, 1303 n.l (9th
Cir. 1982).
53. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 976 (1969).
54. The SEC alleged that the officers and agents of Texas Gulf Sulphur had
purchased stock in that corporation based on inside information concerning a discovery
of extensive mineral deposits on company-owned land in Canada. Id. On April 12,
1964, the corporation had released a press notice in an attempt to dispel rumors
as to the size and quality of the mineral find. Id. at 845. Later, the true value of
the discovery became known to the company and a report was submitted to the
Canadian media on April 15 disclosing the extent of the ore find. Its release, however,
was delayed until the next day, April 16. In the interim, insiders and their tippees
purchased Texas Gulf Sulphur stock. Id. at 847. During the period from November
18, 1962, to May 15, 1964, the price of Texas Gulf Sulphur stock rose from $17
per share to $58 per share. Id.
55. Id. at 848.
56. Id. at 864.
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tion concerning the mineral strike on company-owned land was material
in the sense that a "reasonable man would attach importance to [it]
in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question." 7
Therefore, the court held that because the defendants had "material"
inside information in their "possession" they were subject to a duty
to disclose or abstain from trading.58
Moreover, the court indicated that the duty to disclose nonpublic
information or to abstain from trading would run to the "investing
public."" The Second Circuit reasoned that Rule lOb-5 was based
on a policy of providing investors with equal access to material
information when trading on a securities exchange and that it therefore
would be inherently unfair to allow insiders to profit from an informational imbalance." The court's only limiting requirement was that the
information be material to the transaction. Nevertheless, with the
change in the standard for imposing a duty. to disclose from "access"
to "possession" it appeared that the trend away from the commonlaw fiduciary principle had gained momentum and that the
"unfairness" element articulated by the SEC in Cady, Roberts had
emerged as the policy supporting the regulation of insider trading under
Rule lOb-5.6 '
57. Id. at 849. The concept of "materiality," see supra note 1, is basic to
the securities laws and has been held fully applicable to Rule lOb-5. See, e.g., SEC
v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983); IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir.
1980); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980); Twenty Seven Trust v. Realty
Growth Investors, 533 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Md. 1982). For different tests of materiality,
see 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 15, § 61.02(b)(ii), at 3-74; A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS,
supra note 16, § 7.4(3)(b), at 168.2. In addition to materiality, several recent decisions have imposed other requirements for establishing a lob-5 action. See, e.g.,
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (standing); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680
(1980) (scienter); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (publication); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462 (1977) (deception); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976)
(causation); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972)
(damages).
58. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.
59.

Id.

60. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 36, at 10 ("As the Texas Gulf Sulphur
court had suggested, the law could be perceived as dealing directly with the unfairness
inherent in informational imbalances by prohibiting any trading on unshared material
information . .

").

61. See, e.g., Coulom, supra note 21, at 108 ("In [Texas Gulf Sulphur]
...it appeared that the unfairness element in securities fraud liability had become
paramount."). Some courts have followed the Texas Gulf Sulphur "possession" standard. See, e.g., SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1976); Strong
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In Chiarella v. United States,62 the United States Supreme Court

addressed for the first time the application of Rule lOb-5 to insider

trading. Chiarella was a printer who handled five announcements of
corporate takeover bids. Although the names of the acquiring and
target companies were concealed, Chiarella was able to determine who
the subject companies were from the information contained in the
documents. Before the bids were publicly announced, Chiarella bought
sold the shares after
stock in the target companies and immediately
3
the takeover attempts were made public. Chiarella realized a profit
from his trading and was charged thereafter with criminal violations
'
of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5."

The principal significance of the Supreme Court's decision derives
from its analysis of whether Chiarella was subject to a duty to disclose

under Rule lOb-5. In addressing this question, the Court first determined that silence or nondisclosure could constitute a "manipulative66

violation.
or deceptive ' 6 device for purposes of a section 10(b)
However, the Court noted that "[wihen an allegation of fraud is based
6
upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak."
For nondisclosure to rise to the level of a Rule lOb-5 violation, the
Supreme Court articulated a rather stringent standard by reference
to the common-law fiduciary principle: "The duty to disclose arises
when one party has information that the other party is entitled to

v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1973); Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz,
464 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1972); Jeffries & Co. v. Arkus-Duntov, 357 F. Supp.
1206, 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
62. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
63. Id. at 224-25.
64. Id. at 225. Section 21(d) of the 1934 Act permits the imposition of criminal
sanctions on one who violates Rule lOb-5. Section 21(d) provides:
The Commission may transmit such evidence as may be available concerning such acts or practices as may constitute a violation of any provision
of [the 1934 Act] or the rules or regulations thereunder to the Attorney
General, who may, in his discretion, institute the necessary criminal proceedings under [the Act].
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982). Chiarella apparently was the first case in which a criminal
sanction was sought for a Rule lOb-5 violation. 445 U.S. at 235 n.20.
65. In Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 463 (1977), the Supreme
Court held that § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, by their terms, extend only to conduct
involving manipulation or deception.
66. "Thus, administrative and judicial interpretations have established that
silence in connection with the purchase or sale of securities may operate as fraud
actionable under Section 10(b) despite the absence of statutory language or legislative
history specifically addressing the legality of nondisclosure." Chiarella,445 U.S. at 230.
67. Id. at 235.
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know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and
confidence between them." 68 Mere possession of nonpublic market
information was insufficient to give rise to the duty.69 The Court found
that Chiarella had no duty to disclose because he was not an insider
of the company issuing the information and "had no prior dealings
with the sellers of the target company's securities, was not their agent,
was not a fiduciary and was not a person in whom they placed trust
or confidence." 7 Chiarella's criminal conviction under section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 for the misuse of nonpublic information was reversed.7
The Court's reliance on the fiduciary principle demonstrated its
concern with imposing a duty to disclose nonpublic information on
the basis of any theory that could be characterized as a "novel twist"
of the common law." The Court rejected the trend extending the duty
to disclose beyond the common law and returned to a fiduciary rela-.
tionship standard. 3 The fiduciary standard appeared more restrictive
than the "access" standard formulated by the SEC in Cady, Roberts"'
and struck down the "possession" standard adopted by the Second
Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur." The Court had resurrected the
common-law principle which required a special, fiduciary relationship
to exist between the buyer and seller to give rise to the duty to
disclose. 76
As to the issue concerning to whom the duty should be owed,
the Court refused to accept the view that Rule lOb-5 should either
serve as a great equalizer by which all investors are assured of equal
access to nonpublic information or that it should be the basis for
creating a duty to disclose to the market as a whole.77 The Court
stated that such a broad duty would depart "radically from the
68. Id. at 228 n.9.
69. Id. at 232.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 237.
72. See Pitt, Chiarella Court: Limits on Novel 10b-5 Actions, 43 Legal Times
of Washington, at 12 (March 31, 1980).
73. See Coulom, supra note 21, at 113.
74. See supra text accompanying note 44.
75. See supra text accompanying note 55.
76. In Chiarella, the Court did not make clear what other special relationships in addition to that of corporate insider could give rise to a duty to disclose.
However, Chiarellasuggests the possibility of other special relationships which might
give rise to the duty. See 445 U.S. at 232-33.
77. The Supreme Court expressly rejected the Second Circuit's theory that
"[t]he use by anyone of material information not generally available is fraudulent
. . . because such information gives certain buyers or sellers an unfair advantage
over less informed buyers and sellers." Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232.
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established doctrine that a duty arises from a specific relationship
between two parties," 7 8 and found that "neither Congress nor the
79
Commission ever has adopted a parity-of-information rule." At the
very least, the Court's rejection of the equality of information theory
was a recognition that in silence or nondisclosure cases some measure
of privity and reliance were important elements of a Rule lOb-5 cause
of action.80 For this reason the Court opined that an insider could
not owe a duty to disclose nonpublic information to a purchaser or
seller of securities unless a "fiduciary relationship or one involving
8
trust and confidence" existed between the parties to the transaction.
In Dirks v. SEC,82 the Supreme Court again addressed the issue
of the impact of Rule lOb-5, and the duty to disclose or abstain,
on those who trade on nonpublic information. Dirks represents the
Court's most recent inquiry into a non-insider's liability for nondisclosure under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
DIRKS V.

SEC

FACTS

Raymond Dirks was an officer and securities analyst at a New
York broker-dealer firm, Delafield Childs, Inc., where he dealt exclusively with institutional clients. Equity Funding Corporation of
8
America was engaged in selling life insurance and mutual funds.
On March 6, 1973, Dirks was contacted by Ronald Secrist, a former
officer at Equity Funding who alleged that Equity Funding's assets
8
were grossly overstated as a result of fraudulent conduct at the firm. '
He also stated that various regulatory agencies had failed to act on
85
similar charges made by other Equity Funding employees. He urged
78. Id. at 233.
79. Id.
80. See Pitt, supra note 72, at 14.
81. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
82. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
83. In re Raymond L. Dirks, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1402 (1981).
84. Dirks, 103 S.Ct. at 3258. Sedrist claimed that one-third of Equity Funding's life insurance business did not exist. On March 7, 1973, Dirks met with Secrist
who related the following information: Equity Funding had been creating fictitious
life insurance policies since 1970. By selling these fictitious policies to another company which reinsured them for a percentage of the premiums, management at Equity
Funding sought to generate cash flow, maintain a growth rate, and boost the value
of the firm's stock. By 1972, Secrist estimated that Equity Funding carried about
40,000 fictitious policies. Dirks, 21 S.E.C. Docket at 1402-03.
85. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3258. It is not clear which regulatory agencies Secrist
had contacted. However, the SEC had received other allegations of fraud at Equity

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Dirks to verify the fraud and publicly disclose it."6 Dirks decided to
investigate Secrist's allegations.
First, however, on March 12, Dirks instructed his staff to assemble
a list of Delafield's clients who had interests in Equity Funding. Dirks
then telephoned the president of Boston Company Institutional Investors, Inc., a Delafield client, and relayed the details of Secrist's
allegations concerning Equity Funding. On March 15 and 16, Boston
Company sold 1.2 million dollars worth of Equity Funding securities

which resulted in Delafield earning nearly $4,000 in commissions.
On March 19,
flew to Los Angeles
He met with senior
he had been told of

7

after contacting the Wall Street Journal, Dirks
where Equity Funding headquarters was located.
management at Equity Funding and stated that
fictitious insurance policies. All wrongdoing was

denied. Dirks also met with current and former employees of Equity
Funding who essentially corroborated the charges of fraud. 8 On March
21, he met with a representative of the Wall Street Journal who declined
to write a story based on what Dirks had told him. 9 Shortly thereafter
Dirks spoke with other institutional investors who liquidated more than
16 million dollars worth of Equity Funding holdings. 90

Funding as early as 1971. On March 9, 1973, the SEC was informed of Secrist's
charges of fraud by an official of the California Insurance Department. Dirks himself
contacted the SEC on March 27. 1973. Id. at 3259 n.3.
86. Dirks, 21 S.E.C. Docket at 1403. Secrist provided Dirks with the names
of other present and former employees who he claimed would corroborate his allegations. Id.
87.

Id.

88. On March 20, Dirks met with former vice president Patrick Hopper, who
stated that he was convinced, on the basis of what he heard from others, that Secrist's
allegations were true. Id. at 1403. Later that day, Dirks met with Frank Majerus,
a former Equity Funding comptroller, who admitted to having falsified ledgers to
conceal the fictitious insurance. Id. at 1404. On March 22, Dirks met with Gene
Thibodeau, a former employee in Equity Funding's computer department. He confirmed Secrist's allegations that the fictitious insurance existed. On March 23, Dirks
spoke with another former computer employee, Peter Ronchetti, who had conducted
his own inquiry and found fictitious insurance. He claimed that there were 60,000
fictitious policies at Equity Funding by the end of 1972.
Dirks then met with Brian Tickler, who had worked for a computer company
that had performed services for Equity Funding. He stated that, in 1970, there were
between 10,000 and 12,000 nonexistent policies which Equity Funding had had reinsured. Finally, Dirks spoke with Don Goff, a current employee at Equity Funding,
who confirmed that existence of fictitious insurance business. Id.
89. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3258. Dirks met with William Blundell, the Wall
Street Journal's Los Angeles bureau chief. Blundell feared that publishing the story
might be libelous, but agreed to pursue his own investigation.
90. Dirks, 21 S.E.C. Docket at 1405. On March 23, Dirks contacted the Dreyfus
Corp., which held Equity Funding securities. After making its own inquiries based
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During the two-week period in which Dirks conducted his investigation and spread word of Secrist's charges, the price of Equity
Funding's stock dropped from $26 per share to less than $15 per
share. 9 On March 27, the New York Stock Exchange halted trading
on Equity Funding stock after monitoring the substantial increase in
trade since March 22.92 California insurance authorities impounded
Equity Funding's records and uncovered evidence of fraud. The SEC
then filed a complaint against the corporation. On April 2, the Wall
Street Journal published an article based on the information supplied
by Dirks. Equity Funding went into receivership. 93
The SEC investigated Dirks' participation in exposing the fraud.
After an administrative hearing, the SEC held that Dirks had aided
and abetted9 4 violations of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 95 section
10(b) of the 1934 Act, and Rule lOb-5. The Commission took
cognizance of the fact that Dirks "played an important role in bringing Equity Funding's massive fraud to light" 96 and, in view of his
"unblemished 20-year record in the securities industry," only censured him.9 7
on Dirks' information, Dreyfus sold a $500,000 Equity Funding debenture. Dirks
contacted Tomlin, Zimmerman, and Pramelee on March 26 which liquidated more
than $487,000 worth of its clients' Equity Funding holdings. He then spoke with
Manning and Napier, which liquidated all of its clients' Equity Funding stock amounting to approximately $90,000. After contacting Dirks, John W. Bristol and Co. sold
all of its Equity Funding holdings for more than $8 million. Id.
91.
92.
93.

Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3258.
Dirks, 21 S.E.C. Docket at 1405.
Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3259.

94. The Supreme Court has left unanswered the question of whether § 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 permit the imposition of aiding and abetting liability. See, e.g.,
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 n.7 (1976). An instructive case on aiding
and abetting liability in securities transactions is Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon &
Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1939 (1978). The Second Circuit
defined three elements of an aiding and abetting cause of action: a securities law
violation by the primary tortfeasor, actual knowledge by the alleged aider and abettor
of the unlawful conduct by the primary tortfeasor, and a showing that the alleged
aider and abettor rendered substantial assistance to the primary tortfeasor. 570 F.2d
at 47-48.
*95. Section 17(a) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of securities:
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or . . .
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.

15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982).
96. Dirks, 21 S.E.C. Docket at 1412.

97.

Id. at 1413. For an interesting perspective on why "[w]e should see to
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Dirks sought judicial review of the SEC's decision in the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia.9 8 The court dismissed Dirks'
petition on the basis of the Commission's findings.99 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari "[iln view of the importance to the
SEC and to the securities industry of the question presented by this
ca s e . " °°
DECISION AND RATIONALE

The principal issue addressed by the Supreme Court in Dirks was
whether Dirks had violated the antifraud provisions when he failed
to publicly disclose material inside information which he had received
from a corporate insider and passed to his institutional clients.' 0 1 Justice
Powell, writing for the majority,' 2 began by emphasizing that the
duty to disclose arises from the existence of a fiduciary relationship
between two parties.' 3 The Court noted however that not every breach
of a fiduciary duty by an insider created liability under Rule lOb-5.'1 4
It had been established previously that to violate the rule some element of fraud must be present in addition to the fiduciary
relationship.' 5 The Court found that "this fraud derives from the
inherent unfairness" created by the informational advantage that an
insider has over a purchaser or seller in a securities transaction' 6 and
held that an insider could be liable under Rule lOb-5 only where he
failed "to disclose material nonpublic information before trading on
it and thus [made] secret profits."'' The rationale of the Court was
premised on the notion that "[a] significant purpose of the Exchange
Act was to eliminate the idea that [the] use of inside information
it that the Raymond Dirkses of the future get gold medals rather than censure and
other punishment," see generally Lorie, Insider Trading: Rule lOb-5, Disclosure, and
Corporate Privacy: A Comment, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 819 (1980).
98. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
99. Id. at 846.
100. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3260.
101. Id.at 3258.
102. Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White,
Rehnquist, Stevens and O'Connor. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, dissented.
103. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261, 3262 n.15.
104. Id.at 3261.
105. Id.at 3267 n.27 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199
(1976) (requiring fraudulent design)); see also Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462 (1977) (requiring that there be actual manipulation or deception).
106. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261.
107. Id.
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for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate
office." 108
The Court then analyzed the manner in which a tippee could
become subject to the duty to disclose or abstain from trading on
nonpublic information. Justice Powell first distinguished the obligations of an insider from those of a tippee. "[I]nsiders," he noted,
"have independent fiduciary duties to both the corporation and its
shareholders, [while] the typical tippee has no [similar duties]."' 0 9 The
SEC proposed the theory that Dirks had become subject to a duty
to disclose simply because he knowingly receive material nonpublic
information from an insider. The majority rejected this theory"0
reasoning that the important role of the market analyst to "ferret
out and analyze information" would be inhibited by requiring equal
information among all investors."'
The Court noted that while recipients of inside information were
not to be held to an automatic duty to disclose, this did not mean
that tippees were free to trade on the information. Rather, the Court
recognized "the need for a ban" on tippee trading." ' Justice Powell
articulated the following standard:
[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when
the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should
know that there has been a breach." 3
The Court thus suggested that a tippee's duty to disclose or abstain
is derived from the breach of an insider's fiduciary duty to
shareholders.'"' Its standard established two requirements to determine whether a tippee had acquired a fiduciary duty to shareholders
108. Id. at 3260 n.10.
109. Id. at 3261; see also 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 15, § 66.02(a). "Both an
insider and a tippee have inside information. As distinguished from an insider, a
tippee does not learn inside information in a business capacity or does not have
a legitimate business reason for knowing the inside information." Id. § 66.02(a).
110. The Court stated: "We do not believe that the mere receipt of information from an insider creates such a special relationship between the tippee and the
corporation's shareholders." Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3262 n.15. It noted further that
"[t]his view differs little from the view that we rejected as inconsistent with congressional intent in Chiarella." Id. at 3262.
111. The Court supported this rationale by noting that market analysts in general
can play a central role n revealing information that corporations may have reason
to withhold from the public. Id. at 3263 n.18.
112. Id.at 3263.
113. Id.at 3264.
114. Id.
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not to trade on nonpublic information. First, it must be shown that
the insider had breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders of.
his corporation by disclosing the information to the tippee. Second,
it must be established that the tippee knew or should have known
that there had been such a breach.
The test for determining whether an insider has breached his duty
to the shareholders is whether the insider's purpose in passing the
information to the tippee was to secure a personal benefit." 5 If the
insider's purpose in giving the tip were not personal gain, there would
be no breach of his duty to the shareholders and there could be no
derivative breach by the tippee. According to the improper motive
test, breach is demonstrated by showing that the insider selectively
sold the nonpublic information to his " 'recipient for cash, reciprocal
information, or other things of value to himself.' '"" Absent such
a showing, a tippee who traded on the basis of the nonpublic information would not violate Rule lOb-5.
The Court found that neither Secrist nor the other Equity Funding employees violated their fiduciary duties to Equity Funding
shareholders because their purpose in giving the nonpublic information to Dirks was to expose the fraudulent insurance business." '" Justice
Powell noted that "the [insiders] received no monetary or personal
benefit for revealing [Equity Funding's] secrets,"" ' and concluded
that, "[iun the absence of a breach of duty to [Equity Funding]
shareholders by the [Equity Funding] insiders, there was no derivative
breach by Dirks. '"" 9 Therefore, Dirks "had no duty to abstain from
[using] the information he obtained."' 2
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, criticized the majority for adding "a special motivational
115. Id. at 3265.

116. Id.(quoting Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages
Under the FederalSecurities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 324, 348 (1979)). Despite the
Court's assurances that an insider's motivation might "often" be proved by "objective facts and circumstances," the Court recognized that "determining whether an
insider personally benefits from a particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not
always be easy for courts." Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3266. Further, the Court stated
that "[in determining whether the insider's purpose . . . is fraudulent, the SEC
and the courts are not required to read the parties' minds .... [T]he initial inquiry

is whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider." Id. at 3265-66. The
Court also noted that an insider trading violation can exist where an insider makes
a gift of nonpublic information to a trading relative or friend. Id. at 3266.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.at 3267.
Id.at 3267-68.
Id.at 3268.
Id.
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requirement [to] the fiduciary duty doctrine.""'2 He argued that the
determination of whether an insider breached his fiduciary duty to
shareholders by disclosing nonpublic information should not be based
on whether the insider received a personal benefit but rather on whether
the insider's actions were adverse to the interests of the shareholders.' 2 2
He reasoned that an insider customarily owed a fiduciary duty directly
to the corporation's shareholders and that the relationship between
them was one of trust and confidence. Due to the affirmative duty
imposed by this relationship, the shareholder was assured that the
insider would not harm him unfairly.' 23 Thus, Justice Blackmun argued
that an insider's breach of his fiduciary duty consisted of taking some
action disadvantageous to the shareholders.' 2 He noted that an
insider's motive for breaching his fiduciary duty is irrelevant because
25
the shareholders were nonetheless injured by the insider's actions.'
In the dissent's view, Secrist had breached his duty to the shareholders
of Equity Funding by disclosing material nonpublic information to
Dirks with the intention that Dirks would cause his clients to trade
on that information.' 26 Therefore, the dissent would have affirmed
Dirks' violations of the antifraud provisions by holding that he was
a participant after the fact in an insider's breach of his fiduciary
duty.'

27

121. "Such an innovation," the dissent argued, "excuses a knowing and
intentional violation of an insider's duty to shareholders if the insider does not act
from a motive of personal gain." Id. at 3268 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). According
to Justice Blackmun, Secrist's purpose in giving Dirks the nonpublic information
concerning fraud at Equity Funding was to'allow Dirks' clients to shift their losses
to uninformed market participants. Id. at 3269 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
122. Justice Blackmun criticized the majority's holding that Secrist did not
breach his fiduciary duty to Equity Funding shareholders. He pointed out that the
majority itself had acknowledged that Secrist "could not do by proxy what he was
prohibited from doing personally." Id. at 3270 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In Justice
Blackmun's view this was precisely what Secrist had done. "Secrist used Dirks to
disseminate information to Dirks' clients, who in turn dumped stock on unknowing
purchasers." Id. Therefore, the dissent concluded that Secrist did injure the
shareholders to whom he had a fiduciary duty to disclose.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Justice Blackmun noted that "[tihe fact that the insider himself does not
benefit from the breach does not eradicate the shareholder's injury. . . . [T]he
shareholder has still lost because of the insider's misuse of nonpublic information."
Id. at 3271 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 3274 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
127. The Supreme Court's first mention of tippee liability appeared in Chiarella,
445 U.S. at 230 n.12. In Chiarella, the court characterized a tippee "as a participant
after the fact in the insider's breach of his fiduciary duty." Id. In discussing tippee
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ANALYSIS

The principal significance of the Dirks decision derives from the
Supreme Court's discussion of the manner in which a tippee can
become subject to the duty to disclose or abstain from trading on
nonpublic information. The Court reaffirmed its position, expressed
in Chiarella, that for the duty to disclose or abstain to arise in a
nondisclosure case, a special relationship must exist between the parties to the transaction. 2 ' The Court found that Dirks was not in such
a special relationship with the purchasers of Equity Funding's
securities. 29' In the Court's view, any duty on the part of Dirks to
disclose or abstain from using the nonpublic information concerning
fraud at Equity Funding had to derive from the breach of Secrist's
°
fiduciary duty to the Equity Funding shareholders.' 3
The difference between the majority opinion and dissenting
opinion lies in the manner in which the breach of an insider's duty
is characterized, and points out the divergent means available to achieve
the goals of the securities laws. Both agreed that protecting the
shareholders is an important goal of the securities laws. The majority
opinion, however, emphasized the important role that the market
analyst plays in "ferreting out and analyzing information," and the
' 3
"inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts" ' ' that an equal
13 2
access theory would ceate.
liability, the Court appeared to endorse the idea that it would not limit itself to
holding only fiduciaries to an obligation to make disclosures in trading. In Dirks,
the dissent viewed Dirks as a participant after the fact because he knew that the
information Secrist had given him was material and nonpublic and knew that Secrist
had obtained it through a breach of his fiduciary duty to Equity Funding shareholders.
Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3270 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
128. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
129. The Court acknowledged that in some instances, certain outsiders may
independently acquire the duty to disclose or abstain by entering into a special relationship with the corporation. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261 n.14. The Court identified
underwriters, accountants, lawyers, and consultants as the kind of business relationships which would involve selective dissemination of insider information for a corporate purpose and with confidentiality in mind. Id. These "outsiders" would acquire
an independent duty to the corporation, the breach of which could occur independent
of any insider action.
130. Id. at 3261.
131. Id.at 3261-62.
132. The SEC argued that, unlike Chiarella, the acquisition of the inside
information in this case was accomplished by the involvement of an insider, and
that this was sufficient to pass the duty to the tippee. Id. The Court, however, saw
no distinction between acquisition of information by a tippee from the insider, and
the situation in Chiarellawhere the defendant acquired the information through his
own efforts. Id. at 3262 n.15.
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Implicit in the Court's reasoning is the notion that the market
analyst may legitimately acquire inside information from an insider,
evaluate the impact such information will have on market prices, and
cause investors to trade on his recommendation. To distinguish the
case of fiduciary breach from that of legitimate information gathering, the Court imposed the improper motive requirement for
demonstrating breach of duty. Thus the improper motive requirement
appears to have been an attempt by the Court to "give guidance as
to where the line between permissible and impermissible disclosures
and uses" is drawn so that parties can "[order] their actions in accord with legal requirements."' 3 3
The SEC noted the inherent difficulty in establishing an improper
motive, arguing that it would be a rare situation when transacting
parties could not fabricate some legitimate business reason for passing nonpublic information. 3 " The Court rejected this notion by suggesting that objective facts and circumstances would often allow the
courts to permit an inference of an insider's improper motive of personal gain. "
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun argued that the
insider's relationship with the shareholders is that of a fiduciary, which
imposes a duty on the insider "not to take actions that will harm
[the shareholder] unfairly."' 3 6 He argued that an inside's motive in
giving a tip is irrelevant in determining whether he breached his
fiduciary duty to the shareholders. ' Personal aggrandizement is not
an element, but rather a possible result of the breach of the insider's
duty.
Justice Blackmun noted that Secrist owed a duty not only to
existing shareholders, but also the the purchasers of Equity Funding
securities. As he viewed the facts, "Secrist [had] used Dirks to
disseminate information to Dirks' clients, who in turn dumped stock
on unknowing purchasers." 3 8 The dissent concluded that this act was
inconsistent with the interests of the Equity Funding shareholders,
and that Secrist therefore had breached his fiduciary duty to them.
Since Dirks knew the information was material and nonpublic, and
that Secrist had breached his duty by revealing it, the dissent con-

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id.
See
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 3263 n.17.
at 3265.
supra note 116 and
at 3272 (Blackmun,
at 3271 (Blackmun,
at 3268 (Blackmun,

accompanying text.
J., dissenting).
J., dissenting).
J., dissenting).
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cluded Dirks was "liable as a participant in the breach after the
39
fact."1
As to the majority's analysis, the dissent argued that the Court
was so concerned with the role of the market analyst that it was willing to overlook the fact that "Secrist's and Dirks' activities [were]
paid for with the losses caused to [the] shareholder trading with Dirks'
clients.' '4 0 The dissent found fault in the majority's balancing of the
general benefit conferred on society by Dirks' exposure of the fraud
at Equity Funding against the harm caused to the uninformed purchasers of Equity Funding's securities in that it sanctioned insider
activity injurious to shareholder and investor interests.' 4
IMPLICATIONS

The Supreme Court's analysis of tippee liability in Dirks v. SEC
demonstrates a further diminishing of the force of Rule lOb-5.' 42
Establishing 1Ob-5 tippee liability may be more onerous in several
respects. First, Dirks requires two additional elements to establish tippee
trading liability under. Rule 10b-5. The derivative breach standard
articulated by the Court requires a showing that the insider's disclosure
was a breach of his fiduciary duty to the shareholders, and that the
tippee knew or should have known that there has been such a breach." '"
Second, the Court has taken a restrictive view in terms of the manner in which to establish the insider's breach for tippee liability purposes. The tippee faces lOb-5 liability where the insider breaches his
duty by disclosing information for an improper purpose. An improper
purpose, according to the Court, is one where disclosure is for the
139. Id. at 3270 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
140. In the dissent's view of the facts, Dirks gave the "hard" story of the
allegations to those holding Equity Funding securities. To others, Dirks gave the
"soft" story, a recitation of vague factors that might reflect adversely on Equity
Funding's management. The dissent felt that the effect of this selective dissemination of Secrist's information was that Dirks' clients were able to shift the losses
that were inevitable, due to the Equity Funding fraud, from themselves to uninformed
market participants. Id. at 3269 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 3272-73.
142. In recent years, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a more restrictive
approach to lob-5 liability. Several recent decisions have imposed requirements
necessary to establish a Rule lOb-5 action which have effectively begun "a closing
of the courthouse door" for Rule lOb-5 plaintiffs. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (imposing a standing requirement); Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (requiring a showing of scienter); Santa
Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (requiring a showing of actual
deception).
143. Id. at 3264.
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direct or indirect benefit of the insider. Moreover, despite the Court's
assurances that improper motivation might be proved by "objective
facts and circumstances," the motive element may prove to be a difficult barrier to establishing lOb-5 tippee liability.'
Despite the Court's restrictive approach to lOb-5 tippee liability,
Dirks is likely to encourage future tippee liability litigation. In dicta,
the Court suggests that in some instances, certain tippees-underwriters,
accountants, lawyers and consultants-may become fiduciaries of the
corporation where they "[enter] into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given
access to information solely for corporate purposes." 14 5 These "constructive insiders" would presumably possess independent fiduciary
duties, not derived from an insider's duty.' 6 The Court's recognition
of constructive insiders will likely prompt litigation under this new
theory.
In recent years, the SEC has increased its efforts to check insider
trading abuses.' 7 In the SEC's view, "[ilnsider trading in publicly
traded securities undermines the expectations of fairness and honesty
that underlie public confidence in our nation's securities markets."'
For this reason, the SEC has established an enforcement priority for
actions against insiders who trade on the basis of nonpublic
information.'4 9 The SEC has viewed its available remedies in insider
trading cases-injunction against future violations and disgorgement
of profits-as lacking significant force to deter violations of the
antifraud provisions. 5 ' The SEC has recognized that if illegal trading
is to be deterred, greater risk must face insiders who possess nonpublic information. 5 ' As a result, on September 21, 1982, the SEC
144. The Court recognized the difficulty in establishing the improper motive
element conceding that "determining whether an insider personally benefits from a
disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be easy for the courts." Dirks, 103
S. Ct. at 3266.
145. Id. at 3261 n.14.
146. See supra note 129.
147. Prior to 1978, the Commission initiated only forty cases involving insider
trading. Between 1978 and 1982 the Commission brought over fifty insider trading
cases. COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 21.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g,. Address by John M. Fedders to Compliance and Legal Seminar
of the Securities Industry Association (April 26, 1982).
150. See, e.g., Remarks by Bevis Longstruth to Federal Bar Association Law
Committee, The Fight Against Insider Trading: An Assessment and Evaluation (March
17, 1982).
151. "In short, greater risk must face insiders if illegal trading is to be deterred.
Tougher sanctions are needed." COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 21.
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submitted to Congress the Insider Trader Sanctions Act of 1982152
as a proposed amendment to the 1934 Act. It calls for an additional
remedy in insider trading cases, a civil money penalty of up to three
times the profit gained, or loss avoided, as a result of the unlawful
transaction. 111
The SEC does not view the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks
as being adverse to its insider trading program. Rather, the Commission views the Court's opinion as expressing a "continued, firm disapproval of insider trading." 54 However, the Court's analysis in Dirks
is likely to create difficulties for the SEC's insider trading program.
The restrictive approach demonstrated by the Court may encourage
tippee trading in the future. The general rule that remains clear for
insiders and tippees after Dirks is that a fiduciary duty to disclose
will have to be identified before any liability for trading on nonpublic
information will be imposed under the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws.
CONCLUSION

Insider trading continues to threaten the fairness and honesty of
the United States' securities markets. The SEC and the courts have
attempted to delineate standards to regulate insiders who trade on
the basis of nonpublic information. Rule lOb-5 is one device which
the SEC and the courts have used to impose a duty to disclose nonpublic information upon an insider or a tippee.
In Dirks v. SEC the Supreme Court enunciated a new development of the duty to disclose nonpublic information under Rule lOb-5.
The Court established two requirements to determine whether a tippee had a fiduciary duty to shareholders not to trade on nonpublic
information: first, a showing that the insider had breached his fiduciary
duty to the shareholders of his corporation by disclosing the information to the tippee; and second, a showing that the tippee knew or
152. H.R. 559, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). On September 19, 1983 the House
of Representatives unanimously passed the Act.
153. Id.
154. COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 21. Because the ultimate impact of Dirks
depends on future judicial interpretations of the case, the SEC was instructed to
monitor the effects of Dirks for a period of two years and report back to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. The Committee required the SEC to include in
its report: 1) the number of insider trading cases brought, settled and tried; 2) the
propositions for which counsel cite Dirks in representing clients accused of insider
trading; and 3) a summary and analysis of the lower court decisions citing and interpreting Dirks. Id.
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should have known that there had been such a breach. The determinative test for the fiduciary breach requirement is whether the
insider's motive was to benefit personally from giving the nonpublic
information to the tippee. If the insider's purpose in giving the tip
were not personal gain, then there would be no breach of his duty
to shareholders, and in the absence of breach by the insider, there
could be no derivative breach by the tippee.
If the Court meant to deter insider trading liability by establishing
the improper motive requirement as a determinative factor for liability
under Rule lOb-5, then the result of the decision does not meet these
objectives. Rather, the Court's narrow approach to tippee liability
may encourage trading on inside information.
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